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The Continuing Role of Implied Covenants in 
Developing Leased Lands 
Keith B. Hall* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The particular implied covenants that courts will recognize, the 
duties included under these covenants, and the type of relief available 
for breaches of the covenants have remained generally the same for 
many years. However, public policy that favors an increase in domestic 
production of oil and gas and changes in exploration, drilling, and 
enhanced recovery technologies, creates the potential that parties and 
courts will face new issues (and perhaps see new rules) in implied 
covenant litigation, particularly as to the implied covenants relating to 
the development and exploration of leased premises. 
II. HISTORY AND NATURE OF IMPLIED COVENANTS IN OIL AND GAS 
LEASES 
A "covenant" has been defined as an agreement or promise 
between two or more parties in writing, or, "[i]n its broadest usage ... 
any agreement or contract."1 An implied covenant is one which may 
reasonably "be inferred from the whole agreement and the conduct of 
the parties."2 Jurisdictions within the United States almost universally 
recognize the existence of implied covenants in contracts generally, with 
the most commonly discussed covenant being the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. 3 
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1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 421 (9th ed. 2009). 
2. Id at 419. 
3. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 1983 (200 8);Yarbrough v. Devilbiss Air Power, Inc., 321 F.3d 
728, 732 (8th Cir. 2003) (applying Arkansas law); Sparks v. Fidelity Nat'! Title Ins., 294 F.3d 259, 274 
(1st Cir. 2002) (applying Massachusetts law); Shoney's, L.L.C. v. Mac East, L.L.C., No. 1071465, 2009 
WL 2343674, at* 6 (Ala. July 31, 2009); Smith v. CSK Auto, Inc., 204 P.3d 1001, 1010 (Alaska 2009); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 205 (1981) ("Every contract imposes upon each party a 
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Courts have found that this same implied duty of good faith and 
fair dealing exists in oil and gas leases.4 But for more than 100 years, 
courts also have held that other, more specific implied covenants exist in 
such leases.5 It is generally agreed that implied covenants in oil and gas 
leases originated in dicta from the 1889 Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
decision in Stoddard v. Emery.6 One of the leading early cases 
recognizing the existence of implied covenants in oil and gas leases is 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit's 1905 
opinion in Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co.1 
The recognition of implied covenants in oil and gas leases is now 
widespread, if not universal. Indeed, Michigan statutory law expressly 
allows such covenants to exist in oil and gas leases, while generally 
prohibiting such covenants in real estate conveyances.8 The specific 
implied covenants that various jurisdictions recognize in oil and gas 
leases sometimes differ from one state to the next. Some of the most 
widely recognized implied covenants include duties of reasonable 
development, diligence in marketing, and protection against drainage. 9 
In addition, courts in some jurisdictions recognize an implied covenant 
of further exploration, 10 and some have recognized an implied covenant 
to restore the surface of the land to its original condition after the lease 
is complete.11 
Different jurisdictions use different terminology to describe the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement."). 
4. See, e.g., Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887, 908 (Colo. 2001). 
5. See, e.g., McKnight v. Mfrs. Natural Gas Co., 23 A. 164, 166 (Pa. 189 2) (finding an implied 
covenant of reasonable development). 
6. 18 A. 3 3 9  (Pa. 1889); s ee also 5 PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE A. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & 
MEYERS: OIL AND GAS LAW§ 802, at 3 ( 2009) (describing Stoddards dicta as the origin of implied 
covenants). 
7. 140 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1905); see also JO HN s. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 307 
(5th ed. 2009) (describing Brewster as a "leading case"); 5 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 6, § 802, 
at 4 (describing Brewster as a "landmark" case). 
8. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 565.5 (West 2006) ("No covenant shall be implied in any 
conveyance of real estate, except oil and gas leases .... "). 
9. Some have suggested that each of these actually is a specific application of a more general 
covenant. See, e.g., Joseph Shade, The Oil & Gas Lease and ADR: A Marriage Made in Heaven 
Waiting to Happen, 30 TULSA L.J. 599, 612-13 (1995) (noting that authorities have identified at least 
six different implied covenants, but stating that: "Today, there is a trend toward applying only one 
covenant-namely that the lessee will act as a reasonably prudent operator. This unitary analysis 
utilizes one basic implied covenant with a number of different applications, depending on an infinite 
variety of fact patterns."). But see LOWE, supra note 7, at 311-1 2 (noting that a reasonable prudent 
operator standard is a common element of all implied covenants and acknowledging that some 
commentators have suggested that the implied promise to act as a reasonably prudent operator is the 
only covenant but stating that such "[a] unified analysis does not fit the case method by which the 
courts have developed the various implied covenants"). 
10. See, e.g., Gillette v. Pepper Tank Co., 694 P.2d 369, 372 (Colo. App. 1984). 
11. The Arkansas Supreme Court has held that an implied duty to restore exists under 
Arkansas law. Bonds v. Sanchez-O'Brien Oil & Gas Co., 715 S.W.2d 444, 445-46 (Ark. 1986). In that 
case, the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that a majority of courts had held that no such duty exists, 
but that there was a current trend toward finding such a duty, and the supreme court believed that 
courts following that trend had the better view. Id The Arkansas Supreme Court reiterated the 
existence of an implied duty to restore the surface in Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Murphy Exploration & 
Production Co., 151 S.W.3d 306, 310-1 2 (Ark. 2004). 
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implied covenants even when the covenants those states recognize are 
similar or identical in substance to those recognized in other states. For 
example, Texas recognizes implied duties to develop the premises, 
protect the leasehold, and administer the lease.12 The duty to protect 
against drainage is included in the duty to protect the leasehold,13 and a 
duty to reasonably market oil and gas is part of the implied covenant to 
administer the lease.14 Colorado recognizes four implied covenants: (1) 
to conduct exploratory drilling; (2) to develop the leased premises after 
discovering resources that can be profitably developed; (3) to operate 
diligently and prudently (which includes an implied covenant to 
market); and (4) to protect the leased premises against drainage.15 
A. Why Do Implied Covenants Exist? 
Courts and commentators have expressed several explanations 
regarding the functions served by implied covenants and the theoretical 
source from which the covenants originate. The two most common 
explanations regarding function are that, implied covenants first, fill 
gaps in incomplete contracts and, second, promote fairness and equity.16 
But at least one commentator has posited a third function-that implied 
covenants serve public policy.17 As for the theoretical source of implied 
covenants, a prominent treatise states that implied covenants arise from 
the general principle of cooperation that exists in the law of contracts.18 
In Louisiana, however, the Supreme Court has stated that under its laws 
the implied covenants found in oil and gas leases do not originate from 
the general principle of cooperation found in the law of contracts,19 but 
instead, are particularized expressions of Louisiana Civil Code article 
2710's requirement that a lessee use the "thing leased as a good 
administrator. "20 
12. See Yzaguirre v. KCS Res., Inc., 53 S.W.3d 368, 373 (Tex. 2001). 
13. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 14 n.42 (Tex. 2008). 
14. See Yzaguirre, 53 S.W.3d at 373. 
15. Garman v. Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652, 659 (Colo. 1994); Whitham Farms, L.L.C. v. City of 
Longmont, 97 P.3d 135, 137 (Colo. App. 2003). cert. granted sub nom. Whitham Farms, L.L.C. v. 
Encana Energy Res. Inc., No. 03SC652, 2004 WL 2029371 (Colo. Sept. 13, 2004). In addition, one. of 
Colorado's appellate court divisions has held that the covenant to conduct exploratory dnlhng 
includes both exploration before discovering an initial reservoir and later exploration for additional 
reservoirs in unproven areas. See Whitham Farms, 97 P.3d at 137 (citing Gillette v. Pepper Tank Co., 
694 P.2d 369 (Colo. App. 1984)). 
16. See David E. Pierce, Exploring the Jurisprudential Underpinnings of the Implied Covenant 
to Market, 48 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. lNST. 10-1, 10-9 (2002) (stating that "courts imply covenants in oil 
and gas leases for two reasons: (1) to complete an incomplete contract; (2) to make the 'unfair' 
contract 'fair,' or 'more fair"'). 
17. Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Implied Covenants in Oil and Oas Law Under Federal Energy 
Price Regulation, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1473, 1489-90 (1981) (identifying contractual, eqmty, and pubhc 
policy theories). 
18. 5 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 6, § 802.1, at 8. 
19. Louisiana does recognize, however, a general obligation of good faith in contracts. LA. Clv. 
CODE ANN. art. 1983 (2008). 
20. Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166, 174 (La. 1992). 
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In Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp.,21 the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court held that, in an oil and gas lease in which the only compensation 
to the lessor is to be royalty payments, there is an implied o bligation for 
the lessee to make diligent efforts to produce oil or gas.22 The court 
explained the reason for this implied covenant is that the lessor enters 
the bargain expecting to be compensated for the lease, "and principles 
of fairness dictate that the lessee be obligated to make diligent efforts to 
ensure that the lessor receives the benefit of his bargain."23 
A question closely related to why covenants exist is whether such 
covenants are implied in law or in fact. A covenant is implied in fact if it 
can be inferred from the facts and circumstances of a contract, but the 
covenant is not explicitly stated in words.24 A covenant is implied in law 
if it is not inferred from the contract itself, but is imposed by the law to 
prevent unjust enrichment or to otherwise ensure justice.25 
The classification of a covenant as implied in law or implied in fact 
can affect what statute of limitations will apply26 and whether a lessee 
who has assigned the lease remains liable for satisfaction of the implied 
covenant,27 as well as questions involving the parol evidence rule.28 
Some commentators have suggested that the classification of implied 
covenants as being implied in law or fact could affect venue29 and the 
ease with which parties should be able to exclude the application of 
implied covenants by the use of express provisions in a lease. 30 
Several commentators state that covenants are implied in fact, 
while others state that covenants are implied in law.31 Most courts that 
have explicitly addressed the issue hold that the covenants are implied 
in fact. One of the most recent cases to expressly address this issue was 
the Kansas Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Amoco Production 
Co.32 In Smith, lessors brought a class action against their lessee, 
alleging that the lessee had breached its implied covenant to diligently 
21. 772 A.2d 44� (Pa. 20 1 ). 
22. Id al 455. 
23. Id at 454. This could s upport either the implied-in-fact or implied-in-law theories-either 
the parties contemplated that the lessee would make reasonable efforts (thus, the covenant is implied 
in fact) or equity and fairness require the implied covenant (thus, the covenant is implied in law). 
24. Smith v. Amoco Prod. Co., 31 P.3d 255. 265 (Kan. 2001 ). 
25. Id at 267 . 
26. See. C.fl .. id.; LOWE, supra note 7, at 30R; 5 MARTIN & KRAMER. supra note 6, § 803, at 18.3 . 
27. LOWE. supra note 7. at 3�; 5 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 6, § 803, at 19. 
28. See Smith. 31 P .3d at 267 (quoting commentary by Eugene Kuntz). 
29. LOWE. supra note 7, at 308; 5 MARTIN & KRAMER. supra note 6, § 803, at 19. 
30. LOWE. supra note 7, at 309; see 5 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 6, § 803, at 21. 
31. 5 MARTIN & KRAMER. supra note 6, § R03. at 23 (stating that "we believe there is a large 
element of truth on both sides"); Patrick H. Martin. Implied Covenants in Oil and Oas Leases-Past. 
Prc.fent and Future. 33. WASHBURN L.J. 639, 640 ( l  994) ("While some have contended that implied covcnanl� 
.
are 1mphed m fact. candor requires us to acknowledge that implied covenants are judicial 
creations. JUSI as we are all now legal realists who will admit that courts often make law rather than 
merely find it."). 
32. 31 P.3d 255 (Kan. 2!Xll ). 
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market natural gas produced from its leases with the class members.33 
The parties disputed whether the covenant to market diligently was a 
covenant implied in law, which would result in a three-year statute of 
limitations, or a covenant implied in fact, which would result in a five­
year limitations period. 34 The Kansas Supreme Court surveyed a 
number of cases, both from Kansas and other jurisdictions, as well as the 
writings of several commentators.35 The court noted that courts from 
Oklahoma,36 Texas,37 and Montana38 have held that such covenants are 
implied in fact. Several of the commentators whose publications were 
discussed by the court similarly believed that covenants are implied in 
fact.39 The Kansas Supreme Court determined that this was the better 
view and held that under Kansas law the duty to reasonably market is 
implied in fact.40 Few, if any, states have expressly held that implied 
covenants are implied in law. But, the Colorado Supreme Court has 
reached decisions (particularly decisions regarding who may enforce 
implied covenants) that seem inconsistent with a theory that implied 
covenants are implied by the lease itself, yet are entirely consistent with 
a theory that implied covenants are implied by the law.41 
B. Who Has the Right to Enforce Implied Covenants? 
Some courts have addressed the issue of whether the lessee owes 
implied covenant duties to persons other than lessors, such as overriding 
royalty owners.42 In Garman v. Conoco, Jnc.,43 the Colorado Supreme 
33. Id at 257. 
34. Id 
35. Id at 265-68. 
36 . Id at 265 (citing Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Rosamond, 120 P.2d 349, 353-54 
(Okla. 1941)). For a more recent Oklahoma case reaching a similar conclusion, see New Dominion, 
L.L.C v. Parks Family Co., L.L.C, 216 P.3d 292, 297 (Okla. Civ. App. 2008) (holding that operator 
did not owe duties to owner of forced pooling royalty interest under an implied covenant to market). 
37. Smith, 31 P.3d at 265 (citing Danciger Oil & Ref. Co. v. Powell, 154 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. 
1941)) . The Texas Supreme Court continues to describe implied covenants in a way that suggests they are implied in fact, not law. It states that implied covenants are not favored and should only be 
found to exist when "legally necessary to effectuate the plain, clear. unmistakable intent of the 
parties." In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 743 (Tex. 2003) (recognizing the existence of an implied 
covenant to reasonably develop leased premises). Further, "(a) court cannot imply a covenant to 
achieve what it believes to be a fair contract or to remedy an unwise or improvident contract ... HECI 
Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 888-89 (Tex. 1999) (recognizing implied covenant to protect 
against drainage); see also Union Pac. Res. Group, Inc. v. Neinast, 67 S.W.3d 275, 282. 284 (Tex. 
2002) (noting there cannot be an implied covenant if a lease expressly addresses the subject and 
stating that"[n)o covenant can be implied in an oil and gas lease without 'first' examining the express 
terms of the existing lease contract"). 
38. Smith. 31 P.3d at 266. Smith cited two Montana cases that do not use the phrase "implied in fact," but which state that covenants are implied in order to give effect to the intent of the parties. Id 
(citing Sundheim v. Reef Oil Corp., 806 P.2d 503, 507 (Mont. 1991): U.V. Indus .. Inc. v. Danielson, 
602 P.2d 571, 578 (Mont. 1979)). 
39. Id at 268. 
40. Id 
41. See Garman v. Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652.659 (Colo. 1994). 
42. As part of the consideration for an oil and gas lease, the lessee typically agrees to pay the lessor a "royalty," which will be a specified fraction of the value or proceeds of the oil and gas 
produced pursuant to the lease. The lessee is entitled to ownership of the remainder of the oil or gas 
318 Washburn Law Journal [Vol. 49 
Court accepted a certified question from a federal district court 
regarding whether the owner of an overriding royalty is required to 
contribute a proportionate share of  post-production costs when the 
assignment creating the overriding royalty is silent regarding allocation 
of such costs.44 
The overriding royalty owners argued that the implied covenant to 
market requires the lessee to bear all post-production costs necessary to 
make the gas marketable.45 Conoco disagreed, arguing that the implied 
covenant to market does not require the lessee to bear post-production 
costs incurred in making the product marketable and that the implied 
covenant is not owed to overriding royalty owners.46 The Colorado 
Supreme Court disagreed with both of Conoco's arguments.47 In 
support of its conclusion that the implied covenant to market requires 
the lessee to pay the cost of making gas marketable, the court made an 
analogy to the implied obligation of the lessee to drill and noted that 
drilling must be done at the lessee's expense.48 The court then noted 
that "[s]ome question exists whether the implied covenants under an oil 
and gas lease extend to overriding royalty owners," but the court 
concluded that fairness dictates that overriding royalty owners should 
receive the same protection from the implied covenant as do lessors. 49 
The court noted that another reason lessors and royalty owners should 
not bear a share of costs is that, unlike working interest owners, lessors 
and overriding royalty owners do not have a voice in deciding what 
expenditures will be made.5° Finally, the court rejected Conoco's 
argument that industry custom dictated a different result.51 The court 
stated that industry custom should not be binding on a person unless she 
knows of it or should know of it, and lessors and even overriding royalty 
owners reasonably might not have knowledge of industry custom.52 
Based on these principles, the court concluded that in the absence of a 
contractual provision stating how post-production costs will be 
allocated, neither lessors nor overriding royalty owners should bear any 
that is produced. But as part of a separate agreement, the lessee may agree to pay an "overriding 
royalty" to some third person. The overriding royalty, which typically will be a specified fraction of 
the value or proceeds of any oil and gas that is produced, might be paid to a geologist who helped 
determine the most promising place to drill or some other person involved in the prospecting process. 
Or, an assignee of the rights of the lessee might agree to pay an overriding royalty to the original 
lessee who made the assignment. Thus, the overriding royalty owner is not the lessor and typically is 
not a party to the oil and gas lease. 
43. 886 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1994). 
44. Id at 653. 
45. Id at 656. 
46. Id. 
47. See id at 660-61. 
48. Id at 659. 
49. Id at 659 n.23. 
SO. Id at 660. 
51. Id 
52. Id 
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portion of the post-production costs necessary to make a product 
marketable.53 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed this issue in XAE Corp. 
v. SMR Property Management Co.54 In XAE, the lessee granted "[a]n 
overriding royalty interest of an undivided 1/8 of 7 /8 of all gas . . . 
produced under . . . the leases described . . . to be delivered to the 
Assignees ... free and clear of all costs and expenses whatsoever, save 
and except . . . taxes ... chargeable thereto. " 55 The parties disputed 
whether the costs which were free to the owner of the overriding royalty 
were limited to production costs, so that the overriding royalty owner 
would have to bear a proportionate share of the post-production costs 
associated with gathering, transporting, and treating the gas. 56 The 
resolution of this question turned in part on whether the owner of the 
overriding royalty could enforce the lessee's implied covenant to 
market. The Oklahoma Supreme Court determined that the owner of 
an overriding royalty cannot enforce the implied covenant to market 
unless the lessee has expressly agreed to assume such liabilities in the 
act assigning the overriding royalty (which the lessee in XAE had not 
done).57 The Oklahoma Supreme Court's conclusion in XAE, thus, 
contrasts with the Colorado Supreme Court's conclusion in Garman. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that the lessee's implied 
covenant duties do not extend to overriding royalty owners and the 
Colorado Supreme Court decided otherwise. 
Ill. JURISPRUDENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Implied Covenant to Test 
Early in the oil and gas industry, courts concluded that a lessee has 
an implied duty to promptly begin drilling a test well or wells, generally 
within the first year of the lease.58 But often, it was not practical for a 
lessee to begin drilling that quickly. In order to avoid an implied duty to 
drill a test well within a particular period, lessees began to draft leases 
with delay rental clauses.59 Such clauses provided that the lessee could 
defer or delay any duty to begin drilling within the first year by paying a 
specified amount in delay rentals.6<J Generally, the delay-rental clause 
53. Id at 660-61. 
54. 968 P.2d 1201 (Okla. 1998). 
55. Id at 1202. 
56. Id 
57. Id at 1207. 
58. Gary B. Conine, Speculation, Prudent Operation, and the Economics of Oil and Gas Law, 
33 WASHBURN L.J. 670, 683 (1994). 
59. Id at 684. 
60. Id 
320 Washburn Law Journal [Vol. 49 
would allow the lessee to defer its obligation to drill test wells in 
subsequent years too, by paying delay rentals for each year that the 
lessee did not drill. Now, it is so common for oil and gas leases to 
explicitly address the lessee's duty to drill test wells-by providing that 
the lessee can delay such an obligation by paying delay rentals (or by 
providing that the lease is a paid-up lease )61-that the implied duty to 
test is seldom of significance.62 
B. Implied Covenant of Reasonable Development 
Once oil or gas has been found in paying quantities, a lessee has a 
duty to reasonably develop the property. This duty has been recognized 
for over 100 years.63 Whether the lessee has breached this duty is a fact 
issue.64 Courts will consider a variety of factors in determining whether 
a lessee has breached this duty, including: (1) geological data; (2) the 
number and location of wells drilled on or near the leased premises; (3) 
productive capacity of existing wells; (4) cost of drilling compared with 
the profits reasonably expected; (5) time interval between completion of 
the last well and demand for additional performance; and (6) acreage 
involved in the lease being considered. 65 
If a breach of the covenant is established, the lessor generally will 
be entitled to some sort of relief, typically an award of damages, lease 
cancellation in whole or part, or conditional cancellation. 66 If damages 
are awarded for such a breach, the measure of damages generally will be 
"the full value of royalty lost" by the lessor.67 Awarding damages can 
involve considerations of whether the oil was simply produced later than 
it should have been, in which case the loss will involve interest, and the 
difference in prices between the time the oil was produced and the time 
it should have been produced.68 
C Implied Covenant to Protect Against Drainage 
A producing well drains oil or gas from the surrounding area, and 
when a producing well is located close enough to a property boundary, 
61. In a paid-up lease, a lessee typically makes an up-front payment that serves as both the 
"bonus" that lessees typically pay lessors upon grant of a lease as well as compensation for the 
privilege of delaying the duty to drill test wells. 
62. See id. at 684. 
63. See, e.g., McKnight v. Mfrs.' Natural Gas Co., 23 A. 164, 166 (Pa. 1892). 
64. See, e.g., Sohio Petroleum Co. v. Miller, 112 So. 2d 695, 699 (La. 1959); see also LOWE, 
supra note 7, at 316; cl 5 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 6, § 833.3, at 240-41 (discussing evidentiary 
issues related to whether a duty has been breached). 
65. Eg., Edmundson Bros. v. Montex Drilling Co., 731 So. 2d 1049, 1055 (La. Ct. App. 1999). 
66. LOWE, supra note 7, at 322; 5 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 6, § 834, at 245-46, 249 
(noting when a "conditional cancellation" is granted, the court orders that the lease will be cancelled 
if the lessee does not remedy the breach within a specified period of time). 
67. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 19 (Tex. 2008). 
68. Id. 
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the well will drain oil or gas from beneath the neighboring property. 
Since at least 1896, courts have recognized that a lessee has a duty to 
protect the leased premises from drainage by wells located on 
neighboring properties. 69 To establish a breach of the implied covenant 
to protect against drainage, a lessor must prove that substantial drainage 
from the lessee's field occurred and that a reasonably prudent operator 
would have acted to prevent the drainage.70 The primary means of 
protecting against drainage historically has been the drilling of offset 
wells, but the lessee does not have a duty to drill offset wells unless 
doing so would be profitable. 71 Further, the drilling of offset wells is not 
the only way to protect against drainage. Another way is through 
pooling or unitization. 72 
Some courts suggest that a lessee should be held to a higher 
standard than the reasonably prudent operator standard when the it is 
the lessee of the land being drained, as well as the operator of the well 
that is doing the draining.73 But other courts have rejected arguments 
for a higher standard in such situations.74 
Courts have reached different conclusions about the measure of 
damages for a breach of the duty to protect against drainage. In Coastal 
Oil & Gas Corp. v. GaJZa Energy Trust,15 the Texas Supreme Court 
clarified that, under Texas law, the correct measure of damages for a 
breach of the implied covenant to protect against drainage is the value 
of the royalty lost to the lessor because of the lessee's failure to act as a 
reasonably prudent operator.76 Although Garza rejected other 
measures of damages on grounds that they sometimes will 
overcompensate the lessor, the court noted that, depending on whether 
the offset exceeded the drainage, the correct measure of damages for a 
breach of the duty to protect against drainage are the royalty that would 
have been received on the production from an offset well or that would 
have been paid on the amount of oil or gas drained from the lessor's 
69. See Kleppner v. Lemon, 35 A. 109, 109 (Pa. 1896); see also Bradford Oil Co. v. Blair, 4 A. 
218, 220 (Pa. 1886). In Texas, the duty to protect against drainage exists, but courts refer to the duty 
to protect against drainage as being part of a general duty to protect the leasehold. Garza, 268 
S.W.3d at 14 n.42 (citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622  S.W.2d 563, 568 (Tex. 1981)). 
70. Garza, 268 S.W.3d at 17-18 n.57 (citing Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Helton. 133 S.W.3d 245, 253 
(Tex. 2004)). 
71. See id at 17. 
72. Se. Pipe Line Co. v. Tichauhek, 997 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tex. 1999) (stating that pooling can be 
used to satisfy the duty to protect against drainage); sec Breaux v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 163 So. 
2d 406, 415 (La. Ct. App. 1964) (noting that lessee possibly could satisfy the duty to protect against 
drainage by seeking compulsory unitization), application denied, 165 So. 2d 481 (La. 1964); cl Garza, 
268 S.W.3d at 17-18 n.57 (referring to the possibility of a lessee protecting against drainage by 
seeking voluntary unitization or field-wide regulatory action). 
73. Sec Cook v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 560 F.2d 978, 984 (10th Cir. 1977). 
74. Garza, 268 S.W.3d at 19 n.63. 
75. 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008). 
76. Id at 18-19. 
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property.77 Other authorities have also noted these two ways to 
measure damages for a breach of this duty.78 
D. Implied Covenant of Further Exploration 
As noted above, there is an implied covenant to develop 
reasonably known productive formations once oil or gas is discovered in 
paying quantities. But after production in paying quantities is 
established, is there also a duty to explore further non-productive areas 
where the existence of an oil or gas formation has not been 
established-a so-called implied covenant of further exploration? Some 
commentators suggest that there is, or at least should be, a duty to 
explore non-productive areas,79 while other commentators argue 
otherwise. 80 Texas rejects the existence of any such duty that is separate 
from the duty of reasonable development,81 as does Oklahoma.82 
The Louisiana Mineral Code does not state whether such a duty 
exists. The redactors' official comment to mineral code article 122 
states that there is such an implied duty,83 and the comments have 
persuasive authority.84 But comments to code articles are not law, as 
the Louisiana Supreme Court has stated on numerous occasions and as 
the court has demonstrated by sometimes rejecting statements made in 
the comments.85 Indeed, the comment to article 122 also states that 
there is an implied duty to restore the surface, and the Louisiana 
Supreme Court has repudiated that statement.86 Thus, one must look to 
court decisions to determine whether a duty of further exploration exists 
under Louisiana law. 
Although a prominent treatise states that "Louisiana courts are 
probably the most severe in the country in enforcing an implied duty to 
explore further,"87 relatively few Louisiana cases discuss an implied 
covenant or obligation or duty of "further exploration" in those terms. 
Those who assert that such an implied obligation exists under Louisiana 
77. Id 
78. See, e.g., 5 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 6, § 825.2, at 161 to 168.3. 79. See Charles J. Meyers, The Covenant of Further Exploration: A Comment, 37 TEX. L. REV. 
179 (1958); C. J. Meyers, The Implied Covenant of Further Exploration , 34 TEX. L. REV. 553 (1956). 
80. See Earl A. Brown, The Proposed New Covenant of Further Exploration: Reply to 
Comment, 37 TEx. L. REV. 303 ( 1959). 
81. The leading case is Gifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 696 (Tex. 1959). Other Texas cases have followed Gifton. See, e.g., Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Jackson, 783 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Tex. 1990). 
82. Mitchell v. Amerada Hess Corp., 638 P.2d 441, 449 (Okla. 1981). 
83. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 3 1: 122 cmt. (2000). 
84. See, e.g., Caskey v. Kelly Oil Co., 737 So. 2d 1257, 1262 (La. 1999) (citing LA. REV. STA T. 
ANN.§ 3 1: 122 cmt.). 
85. See, e.g., Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Castex Energy, Inc., 893 So. 2d 789, 797 (La. 2005) 
(stating that comments to the Mineral Code are not law); Ramirez v. Fair Grounds Corp., 575 So. 2d 
8 1 1, 813 (La. 1991) (same). 
86. Terrebonne, 893 So. 2d at 797. 
87. 5 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 6, § 845.4, at 341. 
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law point to a line of cases that begins with the Louisiana Supreme 
Court's decision in Carter v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co.88 In that case, 
a fault divided the leased premises. 89 The lessee had drilled two paying 
gas wells on the 493 acres that were on one side of the fault, but the 
lessee had not drilled any wells on the 824 acres located on the other 
side of the fault.90 The lessee introduced testimony of two geologists 
who thought it was unlikely that gas would be found on the side of the 
fault where the lessee had not drilled.91 The lessee then argued that he 
had reasonably developed the property and any wells drilled on the 
undeveloped side of the fault would be wildcat, exploratory wells.92 
The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's order 
granting partial cancellation of the lease, and some of the language in 
the case supports the view that the case was effectively imposing on the 
lessee a duty of further exploration, subsequent to the finding of gas in 
paying quantities.93 The language most often noted in Carter is 
language quoted from an Oklahoma case, Fox Petroleum Co. v. 
Booker,94 which stated that "it is an implied condition that the lessee 
will test every part" of the leased premises.95 Carter also relied in part 
on Sauder v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp.,96 but a close reading of 
Carter shows some potential ambiguity. Although the defendant 
offered testimony of "two reputable and well qualified geologists" who 
opined there likely was not gas in paying quantities on the undeveloped 
side of the fault, Carternoted: 
All the testimony introduced both by plaintiffs and by defendant is to the 
effect that, according to the history of all such faults in proven oil and gas 
fields, production has been had on both the up-throw and down-throw 
side thereof, with possibly one exception named by defendant's geologist. 
Plaintiffs' expert testified that he knew of no instance where 
production was not obtained from both sides of such fault in a proven 
field.97 
Further, the plaintiff called an experienced operator who was familiar 
88. 36 So. 2d 26 (La. 1948). 
89. Id at 27. 
90. Id 
91. Id at 28. 
92. Id at 27. 
93. Id at 29. 
94. 253 P. 33 (Okla. 1926). 95. Id at 38. Fox contains some language that would be supportive of the existence of an 
implied covenant of further exploration, but this does not mean that such a duty exists under 
Oklahoma law. The issue in Fox was whether the lessee had abandoned a portion of the leased 
premises, not whether the Jessee had an implied duty of further exploration. Id at 34. Further, the 
court held that the lessor had not carried its burden of proving that the lessee had abandoned any 
portion of the leased premises. Id at 39. Moreover, Fox and its progeny have not been the basis for 
a large number of lease cancellations based on abandonment. Finally, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
has held that Oklahoma law does not recognize an implied covenant of further exploration. See 
Mitchell v. Amerada Hess Corp., 638 P.2d 441, 449 (Okla. 1981) ("We thus hold there is no implied covenant to further explore after paying production is obtained .... ") 
96. 29 2 U.S. 272 (1934). 
97. Carter, 36 So. 2d at 26, 28. 
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with the area and had seismic work done in the area.9 8 That operator 
testified that he would be willing to drill a well on the property if he 
owned the lease.9 9  This language suggests that the court may have 
reached its holding based on a conclusion that the lessee had not 
reasonably developed a known field, rather than on the conclusion that 
there existed a further duty to explore. 
Another case from this line of jurisprudence is Wier v. Grubb.100 
In Wier, the plaintiff was a lessee-sublessor who sought cancellation of 
the sublease from the defendants.101 The defendants had drilled three 
producing wells, one of which quit producing after a year, then drilled a 
fourth well that was a dry hole.102 The plaintiff made a written demand 
for further development, but the defendants performed no more 
drilling, and the plaintiff brought suit for partial termination of the 
sublease.103 The evidence showed the four wells drilled by the 
defendants were all on the far eastern end of the property in a relatively 
small area compared to the 335 acres that were subject to the 
sublease.104 
The defendant argued they had reasonably developed the 
subleased premises and that geological information showed it was highly 
improbable that oil or gas would be found on the undeveloped portion 
of the subleased tract.105 The court nevertheless granted partial 
termination, and some language in the opinion seemed to support the 
existence of a duty of further exploration (though not using that 
phrase).106 But, it is noteworthy that the sublease had language, 
italicized by the court, that adopted the terms of the lease, and the lease 
contained terms, also italicized by the court, which provided that if the 
lessee discovered oil or gas in paying quantities, it would diligently 
develop the lease premises and "release such portions of the leased area 
as Lessee may be unwilling to develop."107 Thus, the court's partial 
termination of the sublease appears to have been based in large part, if 
not entirely, on enforcement of the lease's express obligations, rather 
than on an implied duty to further explore. 
Other cases in this line of jurisprudence include Sohio Petroleum 
Co. v. Miller, 108 Sandefer Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Duhon, 109 and Noel v. 
98. Id. at 29. 
9 9 . Id. 
100. 82So. 2d I (La. 19 55). 
IOI. Id at 2. 
102. Id at 4. 103 . Id 104. Id at 5. 
105. Id at 3. 
106. Id at 5. 
107. Id at 4. 
108. 112 So. 2d 69 5 (La. 1 9 5 9 ). In Miller, the Louisiana Supreme Court ordered a partial lease 
cancellation and cited Carter in support of its order. Miller involved a lease that expressly obligated 
the lessee to develop reasonably the leased premises, and the court may have relied in whole or in 
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Amoco Production Co.11° On the whole, these cases may effectively 
establish an implied duty of further exploration in Louisiana, but the 
establishment of such a duty is not as clear as some have suggested.111 
In other jurisdictions, such as Arkansas, the courts have described 
the duty of further development broadly enough that some 
commentators have suggested Arkansas tacitly recognizes a duty of 
further exploration, 112 though the state's courts do not appear to have 
applied by name a duty of "further exploration." In Gillette v. Pepper 
Tank Co., 113 a Colorado appellate court held that an implied duty of 
further exploration exists under Colorado law.114 However, neither the 
Colorado Supreme Court nor any other Colorado appellate court has 
reached this issue. In Kansas, the Deep Horizons Act 1 15 has been 
described as imposing a statutory requirement for further exploration. 116 
This statute deserves mention when discussing the p ossible existence in 
leases of an implied duty of further exploration, but the statute's 
provisions for further explanation are express, not implied, and, of 
course, are imposed by the statute, not by a lease. 
E. What If It Would Be Uneconomical to De velop Further? 
The implied covenant of reasonable development does not require 
a lessee to engage in development that is likely to be unprofitable.117 
Thus, the lessee is not required to develop further the leased premises if 
doing so would b e  unprofitable. But, if it would not be profitable to 
develop further the leased premises and the lessee refuses to release the 
undeveloped areas, is the lessee holding those areas improperly for 
speculative purposes-something which would be disfavored in many 
part on that express provision of the lease, as opposed to an implied covenant. Id. at 699. 
109. 961F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1992). In Duhon, the court cited Carter v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas 
Company, 36 So. 2d 26 (La. 1948) and referred in dicta to a possible duty of further exploration. Id. 
at 1211. 
110. 826 F. Supp. 1000 (W.D. La. 1993). Noel cites caner and specifically refers to carter as 
having established a duty of further exploration. Id. at 1005. But Noel, a federal district court case, is 
not a reliable basis for predicting how the Louisiana Supreme Court would decide the issue of 
whether there exists an implied duty of further exploration. 
111. The lack of clarity in the Louisiana jurisprudence is recognized by a prominent 
commentator from Louisiana, Professor Patrick H. Martin, who has stated that Louisiana "perhaps 
tacitly" recognizes an implied covenant of further exploration. Martin, supra note 31, at 650-51. 
112. Id. (describing Arkansas as perhaps recognizing such a duty). Courts state that, under 
Arkansas law, there exists in any oil and gas lease in which a payment of royalties constitutes the 
chief consideration, an implied covenant that the lessee will explore the property with reasonable 
diligence, so as to produce oil and gas in paying quantities throughout the entire tract. Davis v. Ross 
Prod. Co., 910 S.W.2d 209, 213 (Ark. 1995). 
113. 694 P.2d 369 (Colo. App. 1984). 
114. Id at 372. 
115. KAN. STAT. ANN§§ 55-223 to 55-229 (2008). 
116. Conine, supra note 58, at 688 n.73; see also JOHNS. LOWE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON OIL AND GAS LAW 506 (5th ed. 2008). 
117. See Rush v. King Oil Co., 556 P.2d 431, 435 (Kan. 1976); Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. 
Jackson, 783 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Tex. 1989); Sonat Exploration Co. v. Superior Oil Co .• 710 P.2d 221. 
228-29 (Wyo. 1985). 
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jurisdictions? In Whitham Farms L.L. C v. City of Longmont, 1 1 8 the 
plaintiff argued that the implied covenant to develop requires a lessee to 
release land that has not been developed if it would not be economically 
prudent to develop. 1 19 The parties presented the case to the trial court 
based on stipulated facts and briefs. 1 20 The case involved three oil and 
gas leases that covered a total of 310 acres.121 The three leases 
contained provisions giving the lessees the right to enter into pooling 
agreements, which the lessees subsequently exercised to develop the 
three tracts as a single unit. 122 The only well on the property was drilled 
in 1982 and was recompleted as a producing well in 1997. 123 
One of the surface and mineral owners demanded in 1999 that the 
lessees release the lease, except for the area associated with the one 
producing well.124 Another of the surface and mineral owners made the 
same demand in 2001.125 The lessees refused to release any of the 
leases, and the two surface and mineral owners who demanded releases 
brought suit, requesting a judgment terminating the lease.126 
Both sides agreed that it would not be economically prudent for the 
operator to develop further the oil and gas reserves from the leased 
premises. 127 Yet, they disagreed about the implication of that fact.128 
The lessor argued that the lessee's failure to release the undeveloped 
portions of the lease, despite the lessee's contention that it would not be 
economically prudent to develop further the leased premises, 
demonstrated that the lessee was holding those areas for speculative 
purposes. 129 
The court disagreed, holding that, under the pooling agreement, 
production from a single well was sufficient to maintain the entire 
pooled area.13° Further, prior Colorado cases had held that a single well 
may be sufficient to satisfy implied covenants as to the entire unitized 
areas.131 Moreover, the lessor had not presented evidence that the 
resources could not be profitably developed within a reasonable time.132 
Thus, the lessee prevailed, and the lease was not cancelled. But 
significantly, the court stated that legal authority exists for terminating 
1 1 8. 97 P.3d 1 35 (Colo. App. 2003), cert. granted sub nom. Whitham Farms, L.L.C. v. Encana 
Energy Res. Inc., No. 03SC652, 2CXW WL 2029371 (Colo. Sept. 1 3 ,  2004). 
1 1 9. Id. at 1 37. 
1 20. Id. 
121 . Id. at 1 36. 
1 22.  See id. at 139. 
1 23. See id. at l36. 
1 24. Id. 
125.  Id. 
1 26. Id. 
1 2 7. See id. at 137. 
12X. Id. 
1 29. Id. 
1 30. Id. at  1 39. 
1 3 1 . Id. 
1 32.  Id 
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leases on the grounds that they are being held for speculative purposes 
if: ( I )  the lessee is not developing an area; (2) it appears that it is not 
economically prudent to develop the area; and (3) the lessee is holding 
on to its lease rights in the area for the "mere speculative and remote 
hope that the economics might change and non-viable mineral holdings 
might become profitable at some unspecified time in the future. "1 33 
Although it does not seem that courts have aggressively used this to 
cancel leases, the language of the case does suggest that if a lessee has 
not promptly developed an area and the lessor brings suit for an alleged 
failure to reasonably develop, the lessee should be careful regarding 
arguments that further development would be uneconomical. 
IV. A VOIDING COVENANTS BY DRAITING THE LEASE TO DEFINE THE 
LESSEE'S DUTIES 
Numerous cases demonstrate that an implied covenant will not 
apply so as to contradict directly the express terms of a lease. 
Moreover, an implied covenant likely will not impose a particular type 
of duty if the lease's express provisions impose the same type of duty, 
even if a duty under an implied covenant would not directly contradict 
the express terms of the lease. Thus, a lessee can avoid or limit its 
obligations under an implied covenant by negotiating for the lease to 
govern expressly and preclude the existence of an implied duty. 
One of the recent cases i llustrating this principle is Lundin/Weber 
Co. L.L. C v. Brea Oil Co., 134 a 2004 California appellate court decision. 
In Lundin/Weber, the defendant was the lessee under two leases -one 
granted in 1926 and the other in 1995 -covering certain land in Kern 
County, California.135 The plaintiff was the landowner and lessor. '36 
The lessee drilled several oil and gas wells on the leased property and 
was paying royalties to the lessor. 137 The lessor brought suit, asserting 
that California should recognize an implied covenant of further 
exploration and that the lessee had breached this covenant by failing to 
drill more wells at a depth greater than 3,000 feet and by not drilling a 
well deeper than 5,000 feet . 138 
The lessee argued that California had never recognized an implied 
covenant of further exploration and should not do so now. 139 The lessee 
also argued that even if an implied obligation of further exploration did 
1 33. Id at 1 3R (quoting N.Y. Land Ass'n v. Byron Oil Indus., 695 P.2d 1 1118 (Colo. App. 1 9114)). 
134. 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 768 (0. App. 2004). 
135 .  Id at 769. 
136. Id 
1 37. Id 
138. Id at 769-70. 
1 39. Sec id. at 770. 
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exist under California law, such a duty should not apply in this case.140 
The lessee argued that when a lease expressly defines the scope of a 
particular type of duty, the lease does not contain an implied covenant 
for the same sort of duty (for example, if a lease stated how many 
exploratory wells the lessee must drill, there would be no implied duty 
to drill exploratory wells). Here, the lease expressly defined the lessee's 
drilling and exploration obligations by explicitly stating the number of 
wells that would satisfy its drilling and exploration obligations. 141 
Therefore, argued the lessee, the court should not find the existence of 
an implied covenant of further exploration in the two leases at issue in 
this case, even if the court otherwise would have been prepared to hold 
that California law recognizes an implied covenant of further 
exploration in leases that do not expressly define the lessee's 
exploration obligations.142 
The court briefly discussed the implied covenant of further 
exploration concept, citing a couple of respected treatises and law 
review articles, without concluding whether this covenant generally will 
exist in oil and gas leases under California law. 143 The court then 
examined whether the terms of the two particular leases would preclude 
the existence of an implied covenant to explore further. 144 The court 
noted that, in the absence of a contrary provision in the lease, California 
law does recognize in each oil and gas lease an implied covenant that the 
lessee will use reasonable diligence in the exploration for and 
production of oil.145 Further, California law will allow implied 
covenants to coexist with express covenants if the express covenants do 
not address all phases of a lessee's obligations as to exploration, 
development, and protection of the leased premises.146 However, the 
court stated that implied coven ants cannot conflict with express 
covenants.147 
In this case, the 1 926 lease stated that the lessee would drill ten new 
wells in each of the first four years of the lease, and that the lessee 
would drill those wells to a depth of 1 ,000 feet, unless oil was discovered 
in paying quantities at a lesser depth.148 The lessor in this case was not 
complaining about drainage, but the 1926 lease also happened to define 
the lessee's duty regarding offset wells.149 Relying in part on a 1921 
California case, the court in Lundin/Weber determined that the lease's 
140. See id 
I 41 .  Id at 772-75. 
1 42. See id at 769. 
1 43. Id at 771 (citing Martin, supra note 31 ). 
1 44. Id at 772-75. 
145 . Id. at 771 . 146. Id 
147. Id 
1 48. Id at 772-73. 
149. Id. 
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express provisions regarding the lessee's drilling obligations were 
sufficient to cover all of the lessee's drilling obligations; thus, there was 
no room for the existence of an implied covenant o f  further exploration 
in the 1926 lease.150 
The 1 995 lease stated that, subject to the lessee's right to defer 
drilling obligations by paying annual delay rentals, the lessee would 
commence drilling operations during the primary term "and thereafter 
. . .  prosecute the drilling of a well or wells with reasonable diligence 
until oil or gas . . .  is found in quantities deemed paying by [l]essee."151 
The lease further provided that "[ a]fter the discovery of oil, gas or other 
leased substances in paying quantities . . . [l]essee shall reasonably 
develop the acreage retained . . .  but . . .  shall in no event be required to 
drill more than one well per ten (10) acres" of retained area capable of 
producing oil in paying quantities or 160 acres of retained area capable 
of producing gas in paying quantities.152 The lease also discussed the 
lessee's obligations, subsequent to the primary term, to execute partial 
releases of the lease.153 
The court determined that the express terms of the lease created an 
obligation to drill exploratory wells until oil or gas was found in paying 
quantities. 154 After that time, the lease created an obligation to develop 
reasonably the acreage it retained, defined what would constitute 
reasonable development, and addressed the parties' rights as to 
retention and release of acreage.155 Given these provisions, there was 
no room for the existence of an implied covenant of further 
exploration.156 Because the court determined the express terms of the 
two leases precluded the existence of implied covenants of further 
exploration, the court chose not to express an opinion regarding 
whether California law recognizes an implied covenant of further 
exploration when the terms of a specific lease do not preclude such a 
covenant.157 
Another case illustrating that express lease provisions can 
supersede implied covenants on the same subject is Schroeder v. Terra 
Energy, Ltd,158 a 1997 appellate court case from Michigan. Schroeder 
involved litigation over whether the lessee could deduct post-production 
treatment and transport costs from the sale price of natural gas sold at a 
market miles from a well, when the parties' agreements provided that 
150. Id at 773-74. 
151 . Id at 744. 
152. Id 
153. Id at 774-75. 
154. Id at 775. 
155. Id at 774. 
1 56 .  Id at 775. 
157. Id. 
1 58. 565 N.W.2d 887 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997). 
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royalties would be computed as a fraction of "gross proceeds at the 
wellhead" and also referred to paying royalties based on "the prevailing 
market rate at the wellhead."159 The court noted the issue was one of 
first impression in Michigan.160 The plaintiff lessors argued that 
Michigan law imposes on lessees an implied covenant to market oil and 
gas, and this covenant obligates lessees to bear the costs of making gas 
saleable.161 The lessors also argued that the lessees breached the 
implied covenant by not obtaining the "best available market price" for 
gas. 162 
The court disagreed and concluded that it need not decide whether 
an implied covenant to market exists under Michigan law.163 The court 
reasoned that even if such a covenant exists, it would not override 
express contractual provisions stating how the royalty was to be 
calculated.164 The court interpreted "gross proceeds at the wellhead'' as 
allowing a deduction for post-production costs of treatment and 
transport and interpreted the contract's reference to payment of 
royalties based on the "prevailing market rate" as negating plaintiff's 
argument that the lessee was obligated to obtain the best possible 
market price.165 In holding that the lessee could deduct costs of 
treatment and transportation, the court reasoned that the result was 
consistent with economic theory.166 Because there was no market at the 
wellhead, the value at the wellhead should be calculated based on taking 
the value at the market where the gas was sold and deducting the 
costs-treatment and transport- that made the gas saleable at that 
location. 167 The court noted that other state courts have reached this 
conclusion, as have commentators. 1 68 Further, although no Michigan 
court had decided the issue in the context of a royalty dispute, Michigan 
used this work-back method to calculate the value of gas at the wellhead 
for purposes of severance tax calculations. 1 69 Schroeder, thus, stands for 
the proposition that if an oil and gas lease provides that a portion of the 
post-production costs incurred to make gas marketable are to be 
allocated to the lessor, an implied covenant to market does not 
supersede such provisions in a lease so as to require a lessee to bear the 
entirety of such post-production costs. 
1 59. Id. at 1\90. 
1 60. Id at XIJ! . 
1 6 1 .  Id 
1 62.  Id 
1 63. Id at XIJ5. 
1 64. Id at 896. 
1 65. See id 
1 66. Id at 895. 
1 67. Id 
1 68. Id 
1 69. Id 
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Similarly, in Yzaguirre v. KCS Resources, Jnc.,170 the Texas 
Supreme Court stated that the lessors' argument regarding the scope of 
the implied covenant to market was inconsistent with the express terms 
of the lease and that an implied covenant to market could not override 
express terms of an oil and gas lease.171 In an earlier case, the Texas 
Supreme Court explained: "We have imposed implied covenants only 
when they are fundamental to the purpose of a mineral lease and when 
the lease does not expressly address the subject matter of the covenant 
sought to be implied. "172 Numerous other courts have reached similar 
results.173 
V. LESSEES' STANDARD OF CONDUCT 
Throughout the United States, the standard to which lessee­
operators are held is that of a reasonably prudent and capable operator, 
who takes into consideration both his own interests and those of the 
lessor.1 74 Even states with rules generally favorable to lessors have not 
imposed fiduciary duties175 or strict liability on lessees. 176 For example, 
Arkansas, unlike most states, recognizes an implied covenant to restore 
the surface.177 Further, Arkansas jurisprudence does not require, as a 
prerequisite to a lease termination order, that a lessor make pre-suit 
demand and give the lessee a chance to perform. 178 And Arkansas is 
one of the states that has a statutory Pugh clause. 179 Yet, Arkansas 
170. 53 S.W.3d 368 (Tex. 2001). 
1 7 1 .  Id at 373. 
1 72. HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 889 (Tex. 1998). 
1 73. See, e.g., Williamson v. Elf Aquitane, Inc., 138 F.3d 546, 552 (5th Cir. 1998) {holding that in 
take or pay litigation, under Mississippi law, an implied covenant would not exist when the lease had 
an express provision that covered the topic); Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp., 332 F. Supp. 2d 759, 
784 (W.D. Pa. 2004) (stating that implied covenant to develop the leased premises "appropriately 
exists where the compensation to the landowners is derived solely from royalty payments," but if the 
lease provides for "adequate" compensation to the lessor if the lessee elects not to drill during the 
term of the lease, then there is not an obligation to develop and produce);  Meisler v. Gull Oil, Inc., 
848 N.E.2d 1 1 12, 1 1 16 (Ind. a. App. 2006) {"Initially we note that the implied covenant of 
reasonable development applies only when there is no express provision in the lease governing such 
matters."); Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d I ,  19 n.64 (Tex. 2008) (stating 
when an oil and gas lease provides for royalties and "fail[s] to define the lessee's duty as regards 
development after discovery of paying oil or gas, the law implie[s] the obligation from the lessee to 
continue the development and production of oil and gas with reasonable diligence") (quoting W.T. 
Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 19 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Tex. 1929)); Croston v. Emax Oil Co., 464 
S.E.2d 728, 733 (W. Va. 1995) ("This duty to protect against drainage is predicated upon the notion 
that, in the absence of an express provision to the contrary in a lease, there is an implied covenant in 
the lease that the lessee will protect the lessor's property against substantial drainage."). 
174. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3 1 : 1 22 (2000); see Davis v. Ross Prod. Co .. 910 S.W.2d 209, 2 1 3  
{Ark. 1 995). 
175. Eg., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3 1 : 1 22 (providing that a l�ssee does no� owe a fiduciary duty to 
a lessor); Finley v. Marathon Oil Co., 75 F.3d 1 225, 1 229 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that a lessee 1s not a 
fiduciary of a lessor under Illinois law). 
1 76. The standard of conduct instead is one of reasonably prudent operation. Eg., LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 3 1 : 1 22.  
1 77 .  See, e.g., Bonds v. Sanchez-O'Brien Oil & Gas Co .• 715 S.W.2d 444. 446 ( Ark. 1 986). 
1 78. See, e.g., Davis, 910 S.W.2d at 2 1 2, 214. 
1 79. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-73-201 ( 1 994). 
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recognizes that a lessee is entitled to some deference in deciding how 
many wells to drill and acknowledges that a lessee's j udgments and 
actions need not be perfect.180 
For example, in Sunbelt Exploration Co. v. Stephens Production 
Co.,
181 the lessors and a top lessee joined in a suit seekin g  cancellation of 
the original leases on the basis of alleged failures to develop reasonably 
and protect against drainage.182 In Sunbelt, the original lessees held 
leases in the Gregory Unit and in three adjoining units south of the 
Gregory Unit.183 These four units shared multiple reservoirs. 184 The 
lessees drilled the Gregory No. 1 Well on the Gregory Unit in 1959, but 
did not complete it at the so-called Dunn Reservoir level. 1 85 In 196 1 ,  the 
lessees completed a well at the Dunn Reservoir level in one of the three 
southern u nits, and from 1961 to 1985, they drilled offse t  wells into the 
Dunn Reservoir on the other two southern units. 1 86 
In coming back to the Gregory Unit, the lessee finally recompleted 
its Gregory No. 1 Well into the D unn reservoir in 1971 .1 87 In 1 990, it 
was confirmed that a fault ran through the Gregory Unit, from east to 
west, thereby preventing the Gregory No. 1 Well from draining the 
portion of the Dunn Reservoir that lay south of the fault.188 The lessee 
then promptly drilled additional wells on the Gregory U nit south of the 
fault.189 
In seeking cancellation of the original lease, the lessor and top 
lessee argued that the original lessee breached implied covenants in 
three ways: (1) by failing to recomplete the Gregory No. 1 Well into the 
Dunn Reservoir prior to 1971; (2) by not discovering the fault earlier; 
and (3) by not protecting the Gregory Unit from drainage.190 The 
plaintiffs also cited j urisprudence from other states for the proposition 
that, because one of the lessees owned the draining well, the original 
lessees had the burden of proving that their conduct was reasonable.191 
The Arkansas Supreme Court rejected each of these arguments. 
First, the court noted that, under Arkansas law, the party alleging a 
breach of the implied covenant has the burden of proof . 1 92 As to the 
180. See Da vis, 910 S.W.2d at 213 ("While due deference should be given to the judgment of the 
lessee as operator to determine how many wells should be drilled, the lessee must use sound 
judgment, and promote and protect the interests of both himself and the lessor."). 
181. 896 S.W.2d 867 (Ark. 1995). 
182. Id at 870. 





188. Id at 869-70. 
189. Id at 869. 
1 90. Id at 871.  
191.  Id 
1 92. Id at 872. 
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claim that the lessee unreasonably failed to recomplete the Gregory No. 
1 Well into the D unn Reservoir earlier than 1971, the court noted that 
uncontroverted evidence showed that when the Gregory No. 1 Well was 
drilled in 1959, technology was not available to dete rmine whether the 
Dunn Reservoir had significant amounts of gas. 193 Furthermore, when 
the lessee finally r ecompleted the well into the Dunn Reservoir in 1971, 
the only reason the lessee was able to produce significant quantities of 
gas from that reservoir was by use of what the court called 
"extraordinary measures," such as sandfracing.194 Consequently, even 
though the reservoir did contain significant gas, it was not unreasonable 
to have waited unti l  1 971 to recomplete into that reservoir. 195 
As for the lessee's failure to discover the fault until 1990, the court 
noted that the top lessee's own geologist testified that he missed the 
fault when he reviewed data in 198 1 . 1 96 One of the original lessee's 
geologists testified that he saw evidence of what might be a fault but 
concluded incorrectly that the data merely showed a thinning of the 
reservoir. 1 97 Another geologist, who had done some mapping for the 
original lessee in the late 1980s, testified that he previously concluded 
that there probably was a fault but could not tell in what direction the 
fault ran.198 He also made recommendations for the drilling of a well, 
which the original lessee eventually drilled, confirming the existence of 
the fault.199 B ased on this evidence, the court concluded that the 
original lessee had not breached its duty to act as a reasonably prudent 
operator by failing to discover the fault earlier.200 
Finally, the court concluded that the lessee did not breach its duty 
by failing to drill offset wells.201 Under Arkansas Oil and Gas 
Commission rules, an operator normally would not be allowed to drill 
more than one well from the same unit into the same reservoir unless 
there was a fault dividing the two wells.202 Thus, the court's conclusion 
that the original lessee had not been unreasonable in failing to find the 
fault earlier conceivably could have been enough for the court to  reject 
the drainage claim, but the court also noted that the testimony of 
geologists did not support a contention that there had been significant 
drainage.203 Accordingly, the court also rejected the claim for failure to 
193. Id at 871. 
194. Id at 871. 





200. Id at 873. 
201. Id 
202. Id at 872. 
203. Id 
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protect against drainage.204 
VI. PREREQUISITES TO THE REMEDY OF LEASE CANCELLATION 
If a lessee breaches its duty under a n  implied covenant, the lessor 
might be entitled to an award of monetary damages or to cancellation of 
the lease, depending upon the jurisdiction as well as the type of duty 
that was breached and other circumstances. But cancellation of a lease 
is a harsh remedy.205 Accordingly, some j urisdictions have developed a 
preference for awards of damages, rather than lease cancellation, and 
most jurisdictions that allow lease cancellation as a remedy require that 
the lessor must first give the lessee notice of the breach and a reasonable 
opportunity to cure the breach before the lessor may seek lease 
cancellation.206 This principle was illustrated in Lewis v. Kansas 
Production Co., 207 when the Kansas appellate court was called upon to 
resolve an issue of first impression under the Kansas Deep Horizons 
Act.208 In Lewis, the lessee breached its implied covenant to explore 
and develop the leased premises.209 The lessor sued for termination of 
the lease.210 Although the lessor sent a pre-suit letter to the lessee 
alleging breach, the letter did not suggest that the lessor would accept 
efforts to develop the leased premises, and the district court determined 
the letter did not constitute a demand for the lessee to comply with its 
obligations to develop the property.21 1 The district court granted a 
termination without giving the lessee a chance to cure the breach.212 
204. See id at 872-73. 
205. See McDowell v. PG&E Res. Co., 658 So. 2d 779, 784 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that 
cancellation of a lease is a harsh remedy), writ demed, 661 So. 2d 1382 (La. 1995); cf. St. Luke's 
United Methodist Church v. CNG Dev. Co., 663 S.E.2d 639, 644 (W. Va. 2008) (noting courts 
developed a preference for monetary damages as a remedy, rather than termination of leases, "based 
upon the significant investment intrinsic to oil and gas exploration and development"). 
206. See, e.g., Hayes v. Equitable Energy Res. Co., 226 F.3d 560, 569 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that, under Kentucky law, a lessor must give the lessee notice of an alleged breach of the implied 
covenant of reasonable development and demand performance within a reasonable time before the 
lessor can be entitled to termination of the lease for breach of the implied covenant); Northrup 
Props., Inc. v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., No. 07-30-ART, 2008 WL 818995, at *6 (E.D. Ky. 
Mar. 25, 2008); McDowell, 658 So. 2d at 783 (holding that lessor must give Jessee notice and a 
reasonable opportunity to perform before seeking cancellation of a lease for alleged breach of 
implied duty); Ridl v. EP Operating Ltd., 553 N.W.2d 784, 789 (N.D. 1996). An oil and gas lease may 
be terminated for a breach of the implied covenant to market the product, see Pack v. Santa Fe 
Minerals, 869 P.2d 323, 330 (Okla. 1994), though, the lessor must first demand that the lessee comply 
with the implied covenant and give the lessee a reasonable time to do so. See James Energy Co. v. 
HCG Energy Corp., 847 P.2d 333, 338 (Okla. 1993); Crain v. Hill Res., Inc., 972 P.2d 1 179, 1 181 
(Okla. Civ. App. 1998) (awarding lease cancellation); see also Danne v. Texaco Exploration & Prod., 
Inc., 883 P.2d 210, 2 18  (Okla. Civ. App. 1994) (affirming cancellation of lease for breach of implied 
covenant to market). Some jurisdictions also make pre-suit demand a prerequisite to a suit for 
damages for the breach of an implied covenant. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:136 (2000). 
207. 199 P.3d 180 (Kan. a. App. 2009). 
208. KAN. STAT. ANN. § §  55-223 to 55-229 (2008). 
209. lewis, 199 P.3d at 1 83. 
210. Id. at 182. 
21 1. See id 
212. Id 
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The lessee appealed, arguing that it  should be given a reasonable time to 
develop the property.213 
The appeal turned on the meaning of section 55-226 of the Kansas 
Deep Horizons Act, which provides that all oil and gas leases include an 
implied covenant to explore and develop reasonably the leased 
premises.2 14 The act provides that when a lessee has breached this 
implied covenant, the court may give the lessee a reasonable time to 
comply, or the court may enter an order terminating the lease.215 
However, t h e  last section of the act states that the act "shall not alter or 
affect substantive rights or remedies under any such mineral leases 
under the common law. "216 After reviewing past Kansas j urisprudence, 
the court determined that the rule under the common law in Kansas was 
that if the l essor had not made a demand that the lessee develop the 
leased premises, a court had to give the lessee a reasonable time to 
develop the premises unless demand for development would be futile or 
the lessee had abandoned the lease.217 If the lessee failed to develop 
reasonably the premises within the time given, the court could then 
grant termination.2 1 8  The court determined that this rule still applied.219 
Thus, section 55-226 and section 55-229 could be reconciled by 
interpreting 55-226 as allowing a court to grant termination without 
giving the lessee time to cure its breach if, but only if, the lessor made a 
demand for development, or demand would be futile, or the lessee had 
abandoned the lease .220 
In this case, the lessee had not abandoned the lease.221 Further, 
because the lessee had expressed a desire to develop the leased 
premises, demand would not be futile.222 The trial court implied that 
demand w ould be futile because the lessee had not taken steps to 
develop the leased premises during the course of litigation.223 But the 
appellate court held that under Kansas law the lessee's duty to perform 
was suspended while its title to the lease was under attack.224 
Like Kansas , other jurisdictions requiring notice and an 
opportunity to cure have held that notice terminating the lease, because 
of an alleged breach, is insufficient without offering the lessee a chance 
to cure.225 Indeed, if a lessor wrongfully repudiates a lessee's title to the 
213.  Id. 
214. See id. at 1 83 . 
21 5 . KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-226 (2008). 
216. KAN. ST AT. ANN. § 55-229 (2008). 
2 1 7 .  Lewis, 1 99 P.3d at 185-86. 
2 18. Id. at 186. 
2 1 9 .  Id. at 1 87 
220. See id. 




225. Rid! v. EP Operating Ltd . .  553 N.W. 2d 784, 788 (N.D.  1 996). 
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lease, the lessee's duty to perform is suspe nded.226 
Arkansas law is an exception to the general rule that a lessor must 
make pre-suit demand on the lessee a n d  give the lessee a reasonable 
opportunity to cure a breach before the lessor can be entitled to lease 
cancellation. If t h e  lessor has not previo usly given the lessee notice and 
an opportunity t o  cure, the Arkansas Supreme Court has stated that a 
conditional cancellation, giving the lessee an opportunity t o  cure the 
breach, is preferred.227 Yet, though a conditional cancellation may be 
preferred, an unconditional cancellation may sometimes be granted. 
For example, in Da vis v. Ross Production Co.,228 the Arkansas Supreme 
Court affirmed a n  unconditional cancellation of a portion of a lease in a 
case in which there apparently was no pre-suit demand to perform.229 In 
Da vis, a lessor granted an oil and gas lease covering 120 acres in 1 979.230 
The 120-acre tract was divided into three 40-acre drilling units, and wells 
were drilled on each of the three units. B ut only one of those wells was 
productive, and n o  wells were drilled after 1984.231 In late 1992, t he 
lessor granted a top lease that covered one of the 40-acre units that did 
not have a productive well.232 In early 1994, the original lessee wrote a 
letter to the top lessee, stating that the original leases were sti l l  val id and 
that the top lessee, therefore, must release his top leases.233 In response, 
the top lessee demanded that the original lessee release his lease rights 
to the extent the rights related to the particular 40-acre unit that was the 
subject of the top lease.234 The top lessee 's letter to the original lessee 
was not quoted in the court's opinion, but the letter apparently did not 
demand that the original lessee perform its obligations.235 Fur t her, the 
lessor never demanded that the original lessee perform.236 
Both the top lessee and the original lessee filed applications with 
Arkansas's Conservation Commission for a permit to drill a well on the 
disputed unit.237 Both applicants proposed a location that would be as 
close as possible, under the applicable spacing orders, to the prod uctive 
well on the neighboring unit. mi Thus, by its actions, the original lessee 
ind icated a willingness to perform. 
The original lessee filed a petition to q uiet the title to its lease-hold 
rights, and the top lessee counterclaimed asking for an order cancelling 
226. ( '1111lllnl Oil & C i nll. Corp. v. C iar1.1 Encrity Trust, 2hll S.W.Jd I .  20 (Tex. 2!XlM). 
227. Sec Rolicrllon En le rs. v. Miller 1.nnd & Lum her Co .• 71Ml S. W.2d 57, 5ll ( Ark. I YX.'i ). 
22X. 'l lO S.W.2d 209 ( A rk.  l 'N:'i). 
22Y. Iii. nl 2 1 1 .  
2.lfl. fcl. RI 2 1 Cl. 
2J I .  /cl. 
2.l2. Id 111 .'! 1 11- 1 1 .  
2.U. /c/. n1 2 1 1 . 
2-'-I. M 
2.,:'i .  Sec iJ. 
2.'to . .'ice 1J. 
2.\7. Ill 
2.'X. Id. 
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the original lessee's lease as to the 40-acre unit at issue.239 The court 
found that the approximately eleven-to-twelve year period without any 
activity o n  the unit at issue constituted a breach of the implied covenant 
to explore the land.240 The supreme court granted partial cancellation 
of the lease, specifically cancelling the original lessee's lease as to the 40 
acres in dispute.241 In doing so, the supreme court reversed the lower 
court's holding that there had been no breach of the implied covenant 
and that cancellation was improper.242 Further, the supreme court 
unconditionally granted cancellation of the disputed portion of the lease 
in spite of the absence of any pre-suit demand for performance by either 
the lessor or the top lessee who requested cancellation.243 
A. Questions of La w and Fact 
Oil and gas leases are contracts, and the general rules relating to 
contracts and contract interpretation apply. Because lessees often 
supply the language of the lease, and because lessees often are 
presumed to have more bargaining power, courts sometimes state that 
any ambiguities should be construed in favor of the lessor, or stated 
another way, against the draftsma n.244 Whether an implied covenant 
exists is a matter of law.245 Whether an implied covenant has been 
breached is a question of fact.246 
B. Burden of Proof 
Commentators and courts note that lessors have difficulty carrying 
their burden of proof in breach of implied covenant cases.247 
239. Id 
240. /d a t 2 1 3 . 
24 1 .  Id. at 2 1 4. 242. Id 
243. Id 
244. Sec. c./! . . Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp .. 332 F. Supp. 2d 759, 773 (W.D. Pa. 21X14). 245. Interpretation of contracts gene ra l ly is an issue of law. See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. 
Texas Utils. Elec. Co . . lJlJ5 S.W.2d 647, 650 (Tex. 1 999). Furthermore, l itigants sometimes dispute not 
just the meaning of a particular contract, but whether a particular state's laws recognize a particular 
type of implied covenant at all. See. e.g . .  Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Castex Energy, Inc., 893 So. 
2d 789. XOI ( La. 2005) (holding Louisiana does not recogni7.e an impl ied duty to restore the surface); 
Mitchell v. Amerada Hess Corp., 638 P.2d 44 1 ,  449 (Okla. 1981 ) (stating Oklahoma does not 
recognize an i mplied covenant of further exploration.). 
246. Finley v. Marathon Oil Co., 75 F.3d 1 225, 1 228 (7th Cir. l lJlJ6) (noting that whether lessee 
breached duty to prolect against drai nage was a question of facl); Whi tham Farms, L. L.C. v. City of 
Longmont . 97 P.3d 1 35. 1 39 (Colo. App. 2(Xl3); Ridl v. EP Operating Ltd., 553 N.W.2d 784, 788 (N.D. 
I 996) :  Sonat Exploration Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 7 1  O P.2d 22 1 ,  226 (Wyo. 1 985); see Carter v. Ark. 
La. Gas Co., 36 So. 2d 26. 2X (La. I 94X ). 
247. Coa stal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d I. 1 6  (Tex. 21XlX) ( referring to 
the difficulty of proving the amount of oil or gas lost to drainage) ; see. e.g. , Jacqueline Lang Weaver. 
When [;A.press Cfauscs Bar Implied Covenants. Especially in Niuural GHs Marketing Scenurios. 37 
NAT. RESOURCES J .  49 1 . 491 n.2 ( 1 997) (specul al ing that the invention of 3-D seismic technology 
might make it  easier for lessors to prove that lessees have failed to drill profitable wells. and thereby 
mighl "rcinvigora t(c)  the implied coven ant to develop"). 
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Accordingly, one can argue for the burden of proof to be placed on 
lessees to prove that their actions have been reasonable. So far, that 
generally has not happened.248 The lessor has the burden of proof to 
show breach of an implied covenant.249 
Courts generally will give some deference to lessees in their 
decisions about development.250 And, because lessees presumably are 
driven by a profit motive, a lessee does not breach the implied covenant 
to develop unless he fails to drill wells that likely would be profitable. 
One commentator has argued that a lessee's decisions regarding 
development "should be entitled to enj oy a powerful presumption of 
compliance with his implied covenant duties."251 But other 
commentators have concluded, "it is impractical to rely on the 
self-interest of the lessee alone" given the divergence of interest that 
results from "the fact that the lessee has the risk- and cost-bearing 
working interest under the lease, while the lessor retains a cost-free 
royalty interest. "252 Despite the general rule that the lessor alleging a 
breach of an implied covenant has the burden of proving each element 
of his claim, some courts have allowed the burden to shift to the lessee 
in certain situations.253 
VII. DOES THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF REASONABLE DEVELOPMENT 
OR PRUDENT OPERATIONS REQUIRE THE LESSEE TO ENGAGE IN 
WELL STIMULATION OR SECONDARY RECOVERY? 
Although at least one commentator has argued that the implied 
covenant of reasonable production already leads to overproduction,254 a 
more prevalent view is that public policy should favor increased 
248. There are some exceptions. One statutory exception is the Kansas Deep Horizons Act. See 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-223 (2lXl9) (providing that, as a matter of public policy, an implied covenant of 
reasonable development and exploration exists); see id. § 55-224 (providing for circumstances in  
which there will be a rebuttable presumption that lessee has breached the implied covenant 
established by § 55-223); see id. § 55-225 (providing that lessee has the burden of proof in rebutting 
the existence of a presumed breach). 
249. Whitham Farms, 97 P.Jd at 138-39; Sonat Exploration, 7 1 0  P.2d at 228-29. 
250. E.g., Davis v. Ross Prod. Co., 9IO S.W.2d 209, 2 1 3  (Ark. 1995). 
251 .  Stephen F. Williams, Implied Covenants' Threat to the Value of Oil and Gas Reserves, 36 
INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & T AX'N 3-1 ,  3-7 ( 1985). 
252. Finley v. Marathon Oil Co., 75 F.Jd 1225, 1 230 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting conflict of interest 
between lessor and lessee arising from fact that lessor does not share in the costs and, therefore, the 
risk of drilling); Conine, supra note 58, at 676. 
253. At least one court shifted the burden to the lessee in a case in which the lessor a lleged a 
breach of the duty to protect against drainage. The lessor h a d  made an initial showing that drainage 
existed, and the defendant-lessee also was the operator of the well on neighboring property that 
allegedly was draining the plaintiff-lessor's land. E.g .. El l iott v. Pure Oil Co., 1 39 N.E.2d 295 (111. 
1956). In addition, Professor Lowe states that when a lessor a l leges a breach of the implied covenant 
of
. 
reasonable development: "In Oklahoma and perhaps a few other states . . .  the burden of proof 
shifts to the lessee when an unreasonable period of time has elapsed after the initial discovery." 
Lowe, supra note 7, at 3 16- 1 7. 
254. See Patrick H. Martin, A Modem Look at Implied Covenants to Explore, De velop, and 
Market Under Mineral Leases, 27 INST. ON OIL. & GAS L. & TAX'N 1 77, 205-06 (1976). 
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production, including increased production from existing fields.255 
Further, the lessor will benefit from increased production by way of 
more royalties. Thus, both public policy and the interests of lessors 
might dictate that lessees be required to use advanced t echnology to 
increase production. And operators have been using various 
technologies to increase production since nearly the beginning of the oil 
and gas industry. 
One type of technology used to increase production is well 
stimulation -which includes various methods, such as fracturing. 
Operators have been engaged in fracturing, beginning with explosive 
fracturing, since the 1860s to create cracks in underground rocks in 
order to increase production.256 Fracturing is common now, but it is 
likely to be even more important in the future. Shale plays are 
becoming increasingly important in natural gas production, and 
"fracing" often is the only method to extract profitably natural gas from 
shale form ations.257 
Other types of technology, such as secondary recovery and 
enhanced recovery techniques, attempt to produce more oil and gas 
than is possible using only primary recovery. "Primary recovery" refers 
to the production of oil and gas using the pressure contained in the 
underground formation where the oil and gas is found. However, 
primary recovery can leave up to 70% of the petroleum in the 
reservoir. 258 Secondary recovery involves supplementing the pressure of 
the underground reservoir by injecting gas or water, both of which 
typically are found naturally in underground formations, to boost the 
underground pressure. Operators have also engaged in secondary 
recovery for many years and also now commonly engage in enhanced 
recovery, which involves the underground injection of s ubstances not 
normally found in underground formations.259 
Over the years, secondary recovery, enhanced recovery, and well-
255. See, e.g., Pennzoil v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm., 645 F.2d 360, 380 n.39 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(discussing federal incentives for production from stripper wells). 
256. See NORMAN J. HYNE, NONTECHNICAL GUIDE TO PETROLEUM GEOLOGY, EXPLORATION, 
DRILLING, AND PRODUCTION 422 (2d ed. 2001); see also Roberts v. Dickey, 20 F. Cas. 880, 883-84 
(W.D. Pa. 1871) (discussing patent granted in 1866 for use in explosive fracturing). Hydraulic 
fracturing was developed in 1948, and operators sometimes use acidizing for the same purpose. See 
HYNE, supra at 422-23. Fracturing is particularly useful in recovering gas from low permeability or 
"tight" formations. Eg., Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 ,  6-7 (Tex. 
2008) (discussing the hydraulic "fracing" process). 
257. See Hannah Wiseman, Untested Water.s: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas 
Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115,  123 (2009). 
258. See JAMES G. SPEIGHT, THE CHEMISTRY AND TECHNOLOGY OF PETROLEUM 1 46 (2d ed. 
1991). 
259. See HYNE, supra note 256, at 523. The first method of secondary recovery of oil probably 
involved the reinjection of natural gas into reservoirs, which was first performed prior to 1900. 
SPEIGHT, supra note 258, at 149. Enhanced recovery is the production of more oil from an otherwise 
depleted reservoir by injection of fluids not found naturally in a producing reservoir. HYNE, supra 
note 256, at 477. 
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stimulation technology has advanced.260 Nevertheless, surprisingly few 
recent cases discuss whether a lessee has an implied duty to engage in 
well stimulation, secondary recovery, or enhanced recovery as part of 
the lessee's obligations under the implied covenant to develop 
reasonably or as part of his implied covenant of prudent operation. 261 In 
one Louisiana case, a court awarded cancellation of a lease because the 
court found that a lessee's failure to fireflood amounted to a failure to 
develop reasonably the leased premises. 262 
For the most part, other cases merely have stated that such a duty 
might exist or their statements that such a duty exists have appeared 
only in dicta. The Kansas Supreme Court referred to the possible 
existence of such a duty in Cra wford v. Hrabe,263 in which the court held 
that a lessee had the right, without its lessor's permission, to use and 
inject salt water from other properties into a producing formation on the 
lessee's premises for purposes of a secondary-recovery project.264 The 
court, however, did not go so far as to opine that such a duty exists. 
Several older decisions from Illinois - usually in the context of 
stating that a lessor has the right to engage in secondary recovery- state 
in dicta that a duty to engage in secondary recovery exists.265 In 
addition, an older case from Oklahoma notes that some commentators 
have stated such a duty might exist.266 
VIII. RUMINATI ONS ON THE ST ABILITY OF IMPLIED COVENANT LAW 
Changes to the law of implied covenants, or changes brought about 
by parties drafting leases that expressly define the scope of duties that 
otherwise would be imposed by implied covenants, could come from 
three sources - government, lessors, or lessees. Public policy might be 
260. Sec 11lm PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS: MANUAL OF 
011. AND GAS TERMS 1 033 ( 1 2th ed. 2003) (stating in reference to "secondary recovery" that: 
··Broadly defined, this term incl udes all methods of oil extraction in which energy sources extrinsic to 
the reservoir arc utilized in the extraction"). 
26 1 .  The M1mU11/ of Oil and Gas Tr:rms does not define "well stimulation," but i t  notes that 
"stimulate" is defined by a West Virginia statute as "any action taken by well operator to increase the 
inherent product ivity of an oil or gas well including, but not limited to, fracturing, shooting or 
acidizing, but excluding cleaning out. bailing or workover operations." Id. at 1 092. 
262. Waseco Chem. & Supply Co. v. Bayou State Oil  Corp., 371 So. 2d 305. 3 1 3  (La. Ct. App. 
1979), wrir dewed. 374 So. 2d 656 (L1. 1 979). In an older Louisiana decision, a court held that a 
lessee breached its duty lo develop reasonably the premises by failing to use acidizing technology - a  
type of well stimulation. See Wadkins v .  Wilson Oil Corp . .  6 So. 2 d  720 (La. 1942). 
263. 44 P.3d 442 (Kan. 2002). 
264. Id. at 453. 
265. £.� .. Reed v. Tex. Co .. 1 59 N.E.2d 64 1 .  644 (I l l .  App. Ct. 1 959) (noting older I l l i nois cases 
stating that "it was an implied right, and even a duty. for a reasonably prudent operator to adopt a 
rcpressurmg system for the secondary recovery of oil"); Bi-County Props. v. Wampler, 378 N.E.2d 
3 1  U15 (Il l .  App. Ct. 1 978). 
2fl6: In ll' Shailer's Estate, 2M P.2d 613, 616· 17  (Okla. 1 954) (noting that "[t]here is respectable 
authority to the effect that there is an implied covenant in oil and gas leases that a lessee should 
resort t o  a secondary recovery method shown to be practical and presumably profitable as a means of 
getting additional return from the lease"). 
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well served by changes to the law of implied covenants.267 Why have 
courts not done more to alter the implied covenants? One reason 
probably i s  that the common law is conservative, in the sense of being 
stable and generally slow to change or innovate. And this disinclination 
toward rapid innovation and change arguably is particularly justified 
when dealing with implied obligations in contracts, given that parties 
can, if they choose, explicitly address the nature and scope of their 
various contractual obligations. Indeed, as to mineral leases that 
already have been executed, any significant expansion of implied 
covenants could impose on lessees duties that the parties did not bargain 
for or even contemplate at the time they entered the lease. 
This concern was expressed by the Louisiana Supreme Court when 
it ruled that Louisiana law does not recognize an implied covenant to 
restore the surface in Terrebonne Parish School Board v. Castex 
Energy, Inc. 268 I n  that case, the lessor was the school board of a parish 
on the Louisiana Gulf Coast.269 The school board sued several former 
lessees for restoration of the surface in certain coastal areas.270 The 
school board prevailed in the lower courts, which rejected the lessees' 
argument that there is no implie d  duty to restore the surface.271 The 
lessees sought and obtained supreme court review, but the lessees' 
chances of prevailing in the supreme court could not have looked 
promising; comments to the Louisiana Mineral Code state that such a 
duty exists, and though such comments are not law, they have 
persuasive authority.272 Further, the Louisiana Supreme Court itself 
previously had stated in dicta that such a duty exists.273 Moreover, 
coastal erosion is a significant problem in Louisiana, it is widely 
accepted that oil and gas activities in the coastal marshes exacerbate the 
problem, and there is some degree of public support for requiring oil 
and gas producers to help solve the problem. Nevertheless, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the lower court, holding that there is 
no implied duty to restore the surface and stating that a contrary 
holding would impose duties on the lessee which the parties had not 
267. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 31, at 658 (predicting in 1 994 the future expansion of 
recognition of the implied covenant to restore the surface). So far, though, there has not been any 
significant increase in the number of states recognizing this implied covenant. Texas, which long has 
rejected any implied duty to restore the surface, has maintained that position. See Fenner v.  Samson 
Res. Co., No. 01-03-00049, 2005 WL 21 23043, at *5 (Tex. App. Aug. 31 ,  2005); see also Exxon Corp. 
v. Pluff, 94 S.W.3d 22, 29-30 (Tex. App. 2002) (rejecting claims that lessee had a duty to remove 
equipment and materials) (citing Warren Petroleum v. Monzingo, 304 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1957). 
Furthermore, the Louisiana Supreme Court has pulled back from prior dicta suggesting that such an 
implied duty exists. See Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Castex Energy, Inc., 893 So. 2d 789, 802 (La. 
2005). 
268. 893 So. 2d 789 (La. 2005). 
269. Id at 791-92. 
270. Id at 793. 
271. Id at 794. 
272. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text. 
273. Caskey v. KeUy Oil Co. , 737 So. 2d 1257, 1261 (La. 1999). 
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contemplated and for which they had not bargained.274 
But courts are just one branch of government. Duties expressly 
imposed by legislation or regulation might not literally qualify as 
"implied covenants," but legislation and regulation could have some 
effect on implied covenants. Why have legislatures and administrative 
agencies not done more? Legislatures have enacted some statutes that 
affect directly or indirectly the implied covenants relating to 
development. Some states have enacted what are effectively statutory 
Pugh clauses, which affect the extent t o  which a lessee will have to 
develop the premises in order to maintain the entire lease. 275 Kansas 
has passed the Deep Horizons Act, which under certain circumstances 
creates a rebuttable presumption that the implied covenant of 
reasonable development has been breached.276 And of course, there 
exists some legislation and regulation relating to liability for oil  spills 
and regarding oilfield cleanup, which are relevant · to any implied 
covenant to restore the surface.277 One of the reasons there has not 
been more legislation and regulation is likely that lawmakers and 
regulators are reluctant to alter duties under existing private contracts 
to any substantial degree. 
The second group that could be a source for change is lessors. 
Some have suggested that lessors would become more sophisticated 
with time and bargain for more lessor-favorable provisions in leases.278 
And some lessors do bargain for favorable provisions. In Louisiana, for 
example, many leases still are based on standard forms. But it is not 
uncommon for prospective lessors, including persons unsophisticated in 
oil and gas matters, to retain counsel and bargain for lessor-favorable 
provisions such as standard-Pugh clauses and horizontal-Pugh clauses,279 
as well as provisions explicitly requiring restoration of the surface to 
pre-lease conditions. Indeed, substantial litigation has been generated 
in the last several years by a Louisiana Supreme Court opinion that held 
when a lessee contractually obligates itself to restore the surface to pre­
lease conditions, it is obligated to do just that, even if the cost of 
restoration will exceed the market value of the land in its restored 
274. Terrebonne Parish, 893 So. 2d at 802. 
275. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-73-201 (1994). 
276. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-223 to 55-229 (2008). 
277. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701 -2762 (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:4(c)
.
( I )  (2007) (granting Loui.siana Department of Natural Resources, Office of Conservation the authonty to promulgate regulations for various purposes, including preventing the escape of oil  and 
gas): LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, §§ 101-641 (providing regulations that cover, among other things, proper plugging and abandonment of wells and actions to prevent escape of oil and gas) . 
. 278. See LOWE, supra note 7, at 352 (noting that some have predicted that "implied covenants will become less important as l�ssors become more sophisticated and demand express covenants") . 
. 279. See, e.g., Sandefer Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Duhon, 961 F.2d 1 207, 1208 (5th Cir. 1992) (involving dispute between lessee and lessors who were natural persons over interpretation of a horizontal Pugh 
clause). 
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condition.280 But, the lessors have not driven any wholesale change. As 
for why lessors collectively have not done more, there are probably at 
least three answers. First, many lessors still are unsophisticated and do 
not retain counsel or other expert assistance. Second, for any provision 
to be incorporated into a lease, the lessor must not only bargain for it, 
but must prevail in convincing the lessee to agree to the provision, and 
sometimes that will be difficult. Third, as for duties relating to 
development, it probably is difficult at the beginning of the lease to 
define what should be done, and, t herefore, it can be difficult for even a 
knowledgeable lessor to know what specific obligations for which he 
should bargain to impose on the lessee. 
Why have lessors not done more in the way of filing lawsuits? Why 
have they not sought to use new seismic or other exploration technology 
to show that lessees have not reasonably developed the leased premises 
or asserted that lessees have not adequately used new technology­
either exploration or enhanced recovery technology? Lack of 
sophistication amongst lessors is probably one reason. Limited access to 
such data and the significant expense of utilizing such technology is 
another. Third, to the extent the lessors will be relying on truly new 
technology, a lessee probably has not been unreasonable in failing to 
previously use the technology. Finally, the burden of proof can often be 
difficult for lessors to carry in cases involving an alleged breach of the 
implied covenant of reasonable development. 
The third group that could be a source for change is lessees. 
Lessees probably are in the best position of the three groups to change 
the landscape of implied covenant law. Lessees are in a better position 
than government and the courts because lessees are parties to leases 
and, thus, can bargain for specific provisions. Also, lessees tend to be 
more sophisticated than lessors. Case law is essentially unanimous in 
holding that if a lease expressly addresses a subject, a court should not 
find an implied covenant regarding that subject. And, because lessees 
are the parties that bear the burden of implied covenants, they have an 
incentive to bargain for lease provisions that eliminate, limit, or at least 
specifically define their duties. So, why have lessees not done more? 
First, it is noteworthy that lessees have done some things to limit 
implied covenants. One of the implied covenants that has been 
recognized since the early days of oil and gas jurisprudence is an implied 
covenant t o  drill a test well or wells promptly.281 B ut this implied 
covenant rarely is an issue anymore because virtually all oil and gas 
leases have provisions that expressly address the duty to drill -either 
delay-rental provisions or a provision making the lease a paid-up 
280. Corbello v. Iowa Prod., 850 So. 2d 686, 693 (La. 2003). 
281. Conine, supra note 58, at 683. 
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lease -which, therefore, preclude the existence of an implied covenant 
to drilI.282 And occasionally one encounters or reads a case regarding a 
lease that expressly defines the extent of  the lessee's duty to drill wells 
to develop the leased premises, such as by providing that if the lessee 
drills a certain number of wells, the lessee need not drill any more.283 
Further, some leases specifically define the circumstances in which the 
lessee must drill an offset well. Yet, most leases do not contain such 
provisions. Why not? 
Provisions obligating the lessee to drill a minimum number of wells 
could disadvantage the lessee if the property turns out to be non­
productive. A provision could provide some protection to the lessee by 
stating that if the lessee drills a certain number of wells, he need not 
(but may) drill more wells. However, such a provision could backfire. 
Even if the lease clearly does not require the drilling of a stated number 
of wells, a court could view the stated number of wells as evidence of 
what the parties thought was a reasonable number of wells. Further, 
such clauses would require the consent of all parties to the lease, and 
prospective lessors, particularly more sophisticated lessors, might resist 
such provisions. And, if lessees successfully bargained for provisions 
that went beyond limiting the scope of implied covenants, to eliminating 
or virtually eliminating all duties to develop, courts might find such 
provisions unenforceable as a matter of public policy or might find other 
case-specific ways to avoid enforcing such provisions. Further, it is 
difficult at the beginning of a lease to know what will be reasonable 
development of the property. Finally, there would be some 
transactional costs in seeking such provisions. Negotiations with 
prospective lessors might become lengthier. Also, to the extent the 
lessees might attempt to tailor provisions relating to their development 
duties to the circumstances of specific proposed leases, much more 
analysis and work might be required on the front end of transactions.284 
IX. CONCLUSION AND WHAT TO EXPECT IN THE FUTURE 
Implied covenants are obligations not expressly stated in a 
contract, but which a court will impose on one or both parties. Since the 
early days of the oil and gas industry in the late 1800s, courts have 
imposed a variety of implied covenants on lessees, including covenants 
to drill test wells, to develop reasonably the property after discovery of 
oil and gas in paying quantities, and to protect the leased premises 
282. Id. at 684. 
283. See, e.g., Lundlin/Weber Co. v. Brea Oil Co., 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 768, 773 (Ct. App. 2004). 
284. a Conine, supra note 58, at 684 (noting that common use of delay rental provisions arose 
because "(leases) are often hastily accomplished in an effort to beat competitors in the acquisition of 
drilling rights," frequently prior to conducting geological studies and sometimes before titles are 
cleared). 
2010] The Continuing Role of Implied Covenants 345 
against drainage of oil and gas by wells on neighboring property. 
Authorities disagree on whether these covenants are implied by the 
terms of a n  oil and gas lease itself and are used by courts to affect the 
will of the parties or whether these covenants are implied by law and 
used by courts to promote fairness and equity. Both these theories 
about the source of implied covenants probably have some merit. 
Although there have been significant advances in technology and 
shifts in public policy, implied covenant law has changed remarkably 
little over the course of 100 years. Further, because implied covenant 
law tends not to differ dramatically from one state to the next, the shift 
in the center of gravity of the oil and gas industry from Pennsylvania in 
the early days of the industry to southern and western states has not had 
dramatic effects on the obligations lessees bear under implied 
covenants. Moreover, although some commentators have predicted that 
implied covenant law would become less significant as parties became 
more sophisticated and bargained for lease terms that expressly define a 
lessee's specific duties, this generally has not happened and implied 
covenant law remains highly relevant as part of oil and gas law. 
It is tempting to predict that advances in technology, changes in 
public policy to favor increased production and tighter pollution 
controls, and a hypothesized increase in sophistication of both lessors 
and lessees will lead to significant changes in implied covenant law in 
upcoming years as well as the decreased significance of such covenants. 
But the lesson of history suggests that the law of implied covenants 
instead will change relatively little and will remain highly significant in 
the coming years. 
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